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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STEVEN NORTON, 
Appellant, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Appellee. 
Case No. 20020708 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from the decision rendered by the Fourth District Court, Wasatch County 
wherein the defendant was convicted of DUI a Third Degree on August 28, 2002, and the Court 
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on January 3, 2003. This Court has jurisdiction 
to hear the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-508(8) (1953 as amended). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review of a criminal conviction is a review of the trial court's factual findings 
for clear error and its conclusions of law for correctness. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,935-936 (Utah 
1994). "When it comes to reviewing trial court determinations of law, however, the standard of 
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review is not phrased as 'clearly erroneous.5 Rather, appellate review of a trial court's determination 
of the law is usually characterized by the term 'correctness.' Controlling Utah case law teaches that 
'correctness5 means the appellate court decides the matter for itself and does not defer in any degree 
to the trialjudge's determination of law. State v. Dell 861 P.2d431,433 (Utah 1993); see Kennecott 
Corp. v. State Tax Comm'a 858 P.2d 1381, 1383 (Utah 1993). "This is because appellate courts 
have traditionally been seen as having the power and duty to say what the law is and to ensure that 
it is uniform throughout the jurisdiction. Charles Alan Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of 
Appellate Courts, 41 Minn.L.Rev. 751, 779 (1957); see State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d at 1256, 1266 
(Utah 1993). 
RELEVANT FACTS 
On April 30, 2001 the Legislature made an amendment to Utah Code 41-6-44 6(a)(i), which 
in effect raised the charge for a DUI from a Class B Misdemeanor to a Third Degree Felony, when 
the person convicted of the DUI had "a third or subsequent conviction under this section within ten 
years of two or more prior convictions." Before this amendment the language of the code was the 
same except the time limitation imposed was six years instead often. 
On July 28, 1992, Appellant, Norton, was convicted of DUI. Again in 1996 appellant, 
Norton, was convicted of DUI. When Norton was arrested in 2002 for DUI he was charged under 
the amended statute, instead of the previous statute and was convicted of a third degree felony. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The law in Utah until April 30, 2001, was that if a person had three or more DUI convictions 
within six years the third conviction could be raised from a class B misdemeanor to a third degree 
felony Appellant was convicted of DUI July 28, 1992, and in 1996 In the year 1998 six years had 
passed since appellant's first conviction and under the law he no longer fell under the category of 
Utah Code 41-6-44 6(a)(i) This meant that his conviction in 1992 could no longer be used against 
him to raise any new DUI conviction from a misdemeanor to a felony Under the law this prior 
conviction was no longer valid as a means of augmenting any new convictions 
Pursuant to the amendment made to the statute in 2001 the conviction of the Appellant in 
1992 was used when he was convicted in 2002 thus enhancing the DUI to a third degree felony 
Thus in the year 1998 when 6 years had passed since his first conviction, the Appellant was still held 
under the amended 2001 statute even though the time has lapsed for the enhancement. In essence 
the Statute of Limitations had run on this 1992 conviction and for all intents and purposes this 
conviction could never be used against him This is so even though in 2001 when the Legislature 
adopted a new amendment to the statute changing the time limitation from 6 years to 10 years. 
Appellant argues that the Court misinterpreted the statute and should have found that any conviction 
which occurred less than 6 years prior to the amended UCA §41-6-44 6(a)(i) 
ARGUMENT 
L APPELLANT'S CONVICTION IN 1992 SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED 
IN THE NEW STATUTORY LANGUAGE OF UTAH CODE 41-6-44 6(a)(1) 
BECAUSE THE 6 YEAR PERIOD HAD ALREADY RUN. 
When interpreting new statutes the primary goal of the Court should be to "evince true 
intent and purpose of the Legislature " State v McKinnon. 51 P 3d 729, 731 (Utah 2002) In 
order to discern the Legislature's intent and purpose, the Court should look first to the cbest 
evidence' of a statute's meaning, or the plain language of the act State v Tooele County, 44 
P 3d 680 (Utah 2002) The Court is permitted to look beyond the statute's plain language if the 
language is found to be ambiguous See State v McKinnon. 51 P 3d 729, 731 (Utah 2002) The 
language of Utah Code 41-6-44 6(a)(i) does not specify if all convictions within ten years should 
be included in the analysis and is silent as to those convictions where the statute of limitations has 
run under the previous language of the amended code 
"We hold that a statutory amendment enlarging a statute of limitations will extend the 
limitations period applicable to a crime already committed only if the amendment becomes 
effective before the previously applicable statute of limitations has run, thereby barring 
prosecution of the crime In other words, no subsequent amendment of the statute that enlarges a 
limitations period can resurrect the State's ability to prosecute a crime already barred because of 
the running of the statute of limitations " State v Lusk, 37 P 3d 1103, 1109 (Utah 2001) 
"It is a long-standing rule of statutory construction that a legislative enactment which 
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alters the substantive law or affects vested rights will not be read to operate retrospectively unless 
the legislature has clearly expressed that intention." Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 253 
(Utah 1988); accord Evans & Sutherland Computer Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 953 P.2d 435, 
437 (Utah 1997); Roark v. Crabtree. 893 P.2d 1058, 1061 (Utah 1995). 
The supreme courts's decision in State v. Triptow, 770 P.2d 146 (Utah 1989), addresses 
the requirements for the use of prior convictions for enhancement purposes. "Although Triptow 
deals with the use of prior offenses to designate the defendant as a habitual criminal, the reasoning 
is applicable" to DUI cases. Id. at 146. See also State v. Pooler, 2002 WL 31085087 (Utah App. 
2002). 
The Court said in Del Monte Corp. v. Moore, 580 P.2d 224, 225 (Utah 1978) that "the 
general and well-established principle of law is that statutes prescribing limitations relate to 
remedies; and that the legislature has power to increase the time in which an action may be 
brought. In that connection it should be observed that if the statute has run on a cause of action, 
so that it is dead, it cannot be revived by any such statutory extension. But if the cause of action 
is still alive, the new enactment can extend the time in which it may be brought " Commenting on 
thsi decision the Court said in State v. Lusk, 37 P.3d 1103, 1109 (Utah 2001) that "we believe 
that this language from Del Monte regarding civil actions similarly applies to criminal 
prosecutions." 
"Hence, we hold that once the statute of limitations has run on a crime committed, 
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precluding prosecution of the crime, it is forever barred and a defendant's vested right to rely on 
that limitations defense cannot be eliminated by subsequent legislative action." State v. Lusk. 37 
P.3d 1103 (Utah 2001). 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, Appellant asks the Court to reverse his felony conviction and find 
that the 1994 DUI conviction does not apply under the amended rule of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-
44(6)(a)(i) (1953 as amended). Appellant asks the Court to thus hold that the language of Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6)(a)(i) (1953 as amended) is ambiguous and therefore does not support his 
felony conviction under said statute. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this^Kday of _ \ J ^ > , 2003 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that I hand delivered or mailed the foregoing postage prepaid to J. FREDERIC 
VOROS JR., Asst. Attorney General 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor. P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake 
City, UT 84114-0854 
DATED this _^> day of February , 2003. 
Addendum 
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DEREKP.PULLAN #6633 
Wasatch County Attorney 
THOMAS L. LOW #6601 
Deputy County Attorney 
805 West 100 South 
Heber City, Utah 84032 
Telephone: (435) 654-2909 
Facsimile: (435) 654-2947 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STEVEN NORTON, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
> CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
ENHANCEMENT 
Case No. 011500206 
Judge Donald J. Eyre 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court on July 17,2002, on Defendant's 
motion to dismiss the enhancement of his charge. Defendant was present and represented by 
counsel, Dana Facemyer. Plaintiff was represented by Thomas Low. The Court, having heard 
the stipulations of counsel, received evidence, and heard argument and, being fully advised in the 
premises, makes and enters the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order: 
1 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendant was arrested on November 23, 2001, for Driving Under the Influence, 
in violation of Utah Code Section 41-6-44. His charge was filed as a felony DUI 
due to his two previous DUI convictions during the ten years previous to 
November 23,2001. 
2. The first of Defendant's relevant prior convictions, entered on July 28,1992, 
contains a record from the Heber City Justice Court in which the Justice Court 
judge affirmed that Defendant was advised of "all applicable enhancements/' 
Defendant also signed a "Notification of Enhancement" in that Court in which he 
acknowledged that he understood "than any future conviction on the same offense 
will result in enhanced penalties, which penalties have been explained to me/' 
This record also reflects that Defendant was represented on the case by an 
attorney, J, Bruce Savage. 
3. The second of Defendant's relevant prior convictions, entered on April 4,1996, 
contains a record from the Summit County Justice Court indicating that 
Defendant's guilty plea was entered "freely and voluntarily with knowledge of the 
consequences.'1 The record also reflects that Defendant was represented by an 
attorney on the case, J. Bruce Savage. There is no record that Defendant signed a 
Notification of Enhancement form as he had in the 1992 Heber City case, 
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4 His DUI arrest on November 23^2001, was within ten years of the 1992 and 1996 
DUI convictions. 
5. Defendant has at no time attempted to appeal or collaterally attack his 1992 or 
1996 convictions. Consequently, both convictions remain valid at the present 
time. 
6. At the time of Defendant* s prior DUI convictions, the relevant ttme"period for 
considering prior DUI convictions for enhancement purposes was six years. 
Effective April 30, 2001, the relevant time period was changed to ten years. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (History). This modification of Utah law occurred 
prior to Defendant's arrest for DUI on November 23, 200L 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Rule 9-301 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration requires justice court 
judges receiving guilty pleas to a crime subject to enhanced penalties in the event 
of a repeated conviction in the future to "[ajdvise the defendant, orally and in 
writing of , , . the enhancement penalty which may be imposed in the event the 
defendant is convicted of the same offense in the future/* The only consequences 
set forth for failure to follow this requirement are set forth in Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration 2-211, relating to internal discipline of judges. 
Invalidation of a criminal conviction is not provided by Utah law as a 
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consequence of the failure of a justice court judge to strictly follow Rule 9-301, 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure governs the entry of guilty pleas. 
This Rule does not require a Defendant to be advised of enhancement possibilities 
resulting from future convictions for the same offense. Indeed, the last paragraph 
of Rule 11(e) states, "Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not 
required to inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a 
plea." Consequently, the failure to advise a Defendant of such collateral 
consequences "does not affect the validity of a plea/* Advisory Committee Note 
to Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 1L The possibility that a criminal offense 
may be enhanced in severity if the crime is repeated in the future is just such a 
"collateral consequence," 
The legislature is within its authority to modify penalties for criminal conduct. 
State v. Coleman. 540 P.2d 953 (Utah 1975). 
Defendant was not penalized by the legislature's amendment of Utah Code 
Section 41-6-44 at the time that the amendment was effectuated, on April 30, 
2001. 
Defendant's only penalties will come in the event he is convicted of a violation of 
the recently amended section 41-6-44, which violation is alleged to have occurred 
on November 23, 2001, well after the amendment date. 
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Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court now hereby 
makes and enters the following Order. 
ORDER 
Defendant's motion to dismiss the enhancement of his offense from a third degree felony 
to a class B misdemeanor is dehied. 
DATED this Q> day of January, 2002. 
You are hereby notified that the above Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order 
Denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Enhancement will be forwarded to the Court for 
signature eight days from the date that it was mailed to you unless you notify counsel for Plaintiff 
that you object to its form. 
THOMAS L. LOW, Attorney for Plaintiff 
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